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THIS is a sociological and not a medical book. It would be well to define and describe "The Problem of
Medical Knowledge" before discussing whether social forces have effects on its formation. Certainly
religion, morals, ethics and the law have their effect on the practice ofmedicine but that is not the subject
ofthis book. Here the difficulties ofmedical knowledge are not perceived nor described. Nor is the book
always sure what is medicine. What drug companies do, what some ancillary workers do, is not medicine.
Further, the writers of these essays err in thinking medicine is a science. It makes use of science, as it
makes use of all kinds of knowledge, so far as they are relevant and useful to it, and so far as it can
understand them. Medicine is in truth a management (or an art as it used to be said). It is only a science if
by that is meant the pursuit of the truth and accurate working by precise observation and critical logical
thinking. But that is not what the essayists mean by science.
Moreover there is the knowledge of the text books and the literature, and, what is more important,
there is the knowledge of the individual doctor which he applies, so far as his abilities (and zeal) allow
him, day by day at the sick person's side. This latter knowledge is the greater problem. It is a set of
working hypotheses and "beliefs." They are mostly developed after leaving medical school, from
observation of his patients, from experience in trying to treat them, from contact with fellow
practitioners, and from his reading. His set ofworking beliefs will alter everyyear, and what he "knows"
at 40 is not what he "knew" at 30, and not what he will "know" at 50. And they are not identical with
those of his fellows. How useful his set of beliefs at any time depends on his capacity for criticism of
himself, and of the multiple views pressed on him by so many agencies.
Does he define his terms? Does he revise them? Does he resist the theories pressed on him by
patients? Does he resist their attempted manipulations of his opinions and treatment? Is he credulous or
sceptic? Is he economic of hypothesis? Does he ask himself whether his drugs are really doing good or
not? Does he admit that he doesn't know the cause of this or that disease, and that it is not likely to be
known in his lifetime? Does he resist the comforts of self-deception? Does he resist the expansion of a
notion into abelief? Is he clear that what thepatient needs is cure or alleviation or helpful advice, and not
just "jollying along"? Does he push his methods of investigation so far as they can properly go (and no
further)? Few of us come anywhere near these goals but many try and go on trying.
The enemies ofthis personal development ofthe doctor are the severity ofthe intellectual effort; the
break-in ofcredulousness; thetendency to go with the crowd (witness the great bran decade); the break in
sympathy with the patient who does not share the doctor's premises ("its wind, doctor-if only I could
get it up"); the doctor's, as well as the patient's, need for a placebo. The old practitioner said that success
in practice depended on naming it, blaming it, and treating it. Here are pitfalls. It may bethat formany it
is not worldly success, but the emotional burden of attending sick people, which drives the doctor to
"naming it, blaming it, and treating it." And there are the fallacies in thinking-the canary in the hedge
syndrome, and the kangaroo syndrome ("when first she saw a kangaroo, she said 'Of course, it isn't
true"'). There is the blind trial to prove that the treatment difficult or inconvenient to use is effective,
though it obviously is helpful (faults in design are not looked for in these trials very persistently). There is
the putting ofthe blame on the patient-few obese people can lose weight effectively bydieting. Wearing
masks at work may be next to intolerable.
Help can be had from critical thinking; logic should be taught in the first medical year. Some have
help from a linguistic ability which enables them to understand better patients' speech, gesture,
expression, bearing and demeanour. Some have an instant apprehension which makes them "lucky", like
the generals George the Third approved of. But no one is going to be totally efficient, not even with the
help of computerised advice. So prevention is and always will be better than cure.
Here and there in these essays, they seem to be vitiated by ideas which I think are false. The seeming
acceptance of psychosomatic theories of non-psychiatric disease, the unwillingness to believe that the
extraordinary improvement in personal and public health is based on medical activity, the
underestimating of the importance of genetics, and the imputing of power-hunger as a motive to those
who achieve special knowledge are examples. There is insufficient recognition ofhowprovisional medical
"knowledge" is, and little consideration that "mind" and "psyche" may only be the neuroendocrine
activity of the brain.
The book may be useful tosociologists but it will nothelp doctors in their work. JSL
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